Rocha exarnines the main reasons inflation was initially successful in fighting inflation. But accelerated in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and it became clear in the course of the program that reviews past and current attempts at stabilization.
other losses had not been removed. Pressures to finance enterprises and avoid a liquidity crisis in He shows that inflation in Yugoslavia shares the financial system resulted in a relaxation of common elements with inflation in other highly monetary policy in mid-1990 and a revival of indebted countries, despite appearances otherinilationary pressures. Attempts to reimpose wise. These common elements include a large monetary control met considerable difficulty at transfer of resources abroad unmatched by an the end of tlhe year, includinlg a bizarre episode internai adjustment, resulting in a large internal of expansion of central bank credits without the redistribution of real resources through inflation.
board of governors' approval.
Yugoslavia differs from other countries in It also became clear that the fiscal compothat these internal conditions are not transparent.
nent was not consistent with other elements of Instead of an open fiscal deficit, there were the program. It was clearly not enough to complex interactions among enterprises, comfinance a social program of the magnitude mercial banks, and the central bank, involving, required had loss-making enterprises really been among otner things, the absorption and servicing lorced into bankruptcy and also to cover the of a large stock of foreign exchange liabilities by needs of the bank restructuring program. Seen the central bank.
from this angle, the Yugoslav program of 1990 resembles other heterodox programs that had Other factors contributed to the sharp initial success in reducing inflation but later acceleration of inflation at the end of the eighties faltered because of the insufficiency of the fiscal -especially a large real devaluation in midadjustment. 1988, when an indexed economy drove inflation to a much higher level. In 1989, a preemptive At the same time, the events in the second explosion of real wages added fuel to inflation's half of' 1990 also indicate that, for a stabilization fire.
program to succeed in Yugoslavia, there must be much greater political resolve to cope with wage Rocha argues that the failure to correct indiscipline and loss-making enterprises than hidden losses in the economy was the main was observed in 1990. And the question reason various stabilization attempts failed in the remains whether financial discipline can be 1980s. The 1990 program was the first to imposed in the system only at the macroecorecognize the existence of those hidden losses nomic level and without introducing private and the need for fiscal correction -although it ownership of capital. The ultimate question may also introduced other elements to cope with be whetlher stabilization can succeed without a inflationary inertia. The program succeeded in comprehlensive privatization program. eliminating the central bank's own deficit and
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Introduction.
The reversal of external financing flows during the 19808 forced Yugoslavia to undertake drastic measures to balance its external accounts. The external adjustment consisted primarily of large real exchange rate devaluations and, initially, quantitative restrictions on imports. Although these measures were able to generate increasing current account surpluses, economic activity stagnated and inflation accelerated almost continuously (figure 1 and table 1).
Moreover, the absence of fiscal imbalances in the economy (figure 1) might suggest that the nature of inflation in Yugoslavia is entirely non fiscal. While it is true that many hyperinflation episodes are triggered by balance of payments difficulties and large exchange rate devaluations, the complete absence of fiscal imbalances from the overall picture in the case of Yugoslavia is intriguing. Indeed, even the "balance of payments view of inflation" recognizes the role of fiscal deficits in the determination of inflation, although such a role is assumed to be less central than under the "fiscal view of inflation". In the former, the exchange rate assumes the central role, while fiscal deficits contribute to inflation mostly through endogenous interactions with the exchange rate and the inflation rate itself (Dornbusch 1987; The paper shows that the acceleration of inflation in Yugoslavia after 1982 resembles in part the phenomenon of inflation in other high indebted countries, despite initial appearances. The resemblance lies on three common elements.
The first is the adverse impact that large real devaluations had on the major holders of foreign liabilities--in the case of Yugoslavia, the enterprises and the central bant:. The second element was the lack of internal adjustment by enterprises or the public sector to match the large transfer of resources abroad.
Instead, enterprise losses increased through the 1980s, partly as a result of the real devaluations and increasing problems of overstaffing. The third element was the internal generation of resources through inflation.
Inflation in Yugoslavia seems to differ from this rather familiar story due to the lack.of transparency of internal conditions. Instead of an open fiscal deficit, there were complex interactions between enterprises, commercial banks and the central bank, involving, among other things, the assamption of a share of debt service payments by the latter. The situation was further complicated by the existence of a large stock of foreign exchange deposits held by residents in t0-domestic financial system. The central bank also absorbed these deposits in order to protect the enterprises and commercial banks from greater financial difficulties, thus increasing further the level of its quasifiscal expenditures.
While the financing of hidden losses was a permanent source of monetary expansion and inflation through the 1980s, the paper also assesses the contribution of non-fiscal factors to the sharp acceleration of inflation at the very end of the decade--the rate of inflation increased more than tenfold between mid-1988 and end-1989. More specifically, the paper assesses the impact of a large real devaluation in mid-1988 in the context of an indexed economy, and also the impact of an explosion of real wages in the period preceding the stabilization program of 1990. The paper presents some econometric evidence indicating that these factors became indeed more important at the end of the decade. 1
Finally, the paper reviews the performance of stabilization programs in Yugoslavia, and assesses the perspectives of the stabilization program of January 1990, the first program that recognizes the existence of hidden losses in the economy and the need for a fiscal correction.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section examines the contribution of "fundamentals" to the acceleration of inflation in the 1980s.
It examines the links between enterprises' financial imbalances, central bank Other studies provide a detailed examination of the causes A e.fterprises' losses, and their distribution inside Yugoslavia (Knight 1984; Konovalov 1989; and Saldanha 1989) . For the purposes of this paper highlighting the main findings of these studies is sufficient. Excessive personnel and the setting of wages by criteria completely divorced from productivity stand out as one of the major causes behind poor financial performance. Other X-inefficiencies in the use of material inputs are also a major cause 2 . The losses also reflect investment decisions made at very distorted relative prices and without any serious consideration about potential demand. These investments were undertaken mostly during the 1960s and 19709, and financed in good part by foreign credits.
I See Rocha (1989) , for an analysis of the role played by the finaLacial system in the Yugoslav inflation, Bole and Gaspari (1990) for a detailed analysis of policy regimes during the 1980s, and the earlier studies of Mates (1987) , Hencinger (1987) and Gaspari (1988) .
Finally, the distorted tax system which prevailed in Yugoslavia was also aS a cause of enterprise losses. For one, excessive payroll taxes increased significantly the cost of labor to the enterprises.
Also, the base of the enterprise Income tax was defined as the income before the payment of wages, and enterprises paid income taxes even if they generated net losses.
As shown in GSP growth rates declined from 7 percent in the 19709 to 0.7 percent in the 1980s, the rates of unemployment increased very slightly between the two decades-3 The full impact of real devaluations on interest pAvments was, however, reduced by the transfer of some debt service payments to the central bank.
-from 12 to less than 14 percent. As a result, the amount of excess labor in Yugoslav enterprises is estimated to have increased to 20 percent of the labor force at the and of the 1980s (Mencinger 1989) . The lack of adjustment of Yugoslav enterprises is further illustrated in figure 2, which shows the absence of a relationship between changes in the rate of unexLloyment and output growth rates (the Okun's law) in Yugoslavia, in contrast with the US and German cases (see Gordon 1984; Okun 1970) 4.
Finally, changes in the tax structure during the 1980s had a very adverse impact on enterprises, since they amounted to a shift from indirect taxes to heavier payroll and enterprise income taxes--the share of these two taxes in total tax revenues increased from 50 to 67 percent between 1983 and 19&9 (Ding 1990 and Mates 1991) . Thus, these changes increased the costs of excess lab"r in Yugoslav enterprises.
The existence of enterprise losses raises the question of how these losses 5 Figure 3 show the monthly averages of realized real rates on one year time deposits, computed by rt = (1 + it)/(l + at+,), where r and it are the real and nominal interest rates at t and lrt+l the inflation rate between t and t+1. Sources National Bank of Yugoslavia.
The absorption of the stock was done through the introduction of a foreign exchange insurance scheme that involved the transfer of FX deposits to the central bank in exchange for an equivalent amount of low interest Dinar credits from the central bank. The purpose of the scheme was to shield commercial banks against foreign exchange losses, while also allowing them to keep granting subsidized credits to enterprises.
The fact that the central bank started servicing a large volume of foreigr.
liabili.zies while charging negative real interest rates on all its credits generated a quasi-fiscal deficit that constituted an important source of monetary expansion. This problem can be examined in more detail by considering the summarized balance sheet identity of the central bank in first differences:
Where C -central bank credits, H -base money (currency plus reserves), 
Where the star superscript denotes a foreign exchange-denominated variable.
The variations in the central banks' net worth are determined by the combination of its income statement and revaluation accounts
Where i., and ir are the interest rates on credits and bank reserves, respectively. The interest rate on all foreign-denominated assets and liabilities are assumed equal to i for simplicity. The hats indicate percentage changes 6 . The interest revenues or expenditures of foreign-denominated variables are adjusted for the exchange rate depreciation. They can actually be broken down between a cash and a capital loss terms7.
Combining equations (1) and (3) and solving for the variations in base money yields:
Equation (4) indicates that base money is expanded when there is an increase in domestic credits or a decrease in net foreign liabilities, or when the central bank runs an excess of interest expenditures over revenues. Note that the capital gain/loss terms in equations (2) and (3) cancel out. A depreciation generates a capital loss on the stock of net foreign liabilities but has no immediate impact on base money creation. However, the capital loss is eventually realized through interest payments or a decrease in the stock.
6 . E -El/..
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A (i + E)NFL*E -i*NFL*E + NFL E, where the first term is the central bank's cash expenditures and the second the capital loss on the stock resulting from the depreciations. since the issue of real resource transfers becomes much more clear. Dividing both sides of the equation by the domestic price levelp P, and the foreigndenominated stocks by the international price level, P *, and splitting the nominal interest rates between the real rate and the inflation premium, i -r + f, where r is the associated real rate and x the rate of inflation, one obtains:
Hi/P irR/P cnfl*e -(rcc -r*nfl*e) Consider first the real balance sheet of the central bank in figure 4.
After 1982 the real stock of credits fell much faster than the real stock of base money. The decline in real base money reflects the decline in the real demand for financial assets, while the decline in real credits reflects not only this factor, but also two additional factors, namely, the loss associated with the real interest flows and the net repayments of foreign liabilities. This point can be clarified further by rearranging equation (5) and splitting seignorage between the inflation tax, fh, and the real changes in the stock, hs h + nfl*e + (r c -r nfl e) + irh (6) Where the interests on reserves are disregarded for simplicity. Equation (6) 8 xl/P. Note also that X/P -x + ¢x ehowe that real credits grow less than the real stock of base money when net foreign liabilities decrease or when the real interest flows are negative, and grow more than real base money the larger the revenues from the inflation tax.
Of course, the two last terms capture the changes in the real net worth of the central bank. The inflation tax is a real source of revenue to the central bank and increases its real net worth, while the real interest losses decrease it.
When the inflation tax is smaller (larger) than the real interest losses there is a decrease (increase) in the real net worth. A decrease in the real net worth will be reflected in a decline of real credits relative to base money, unless there is an increase in net foreign liabilities. If the real net worth increases, but the if the inflation tax is also used to finance the net repayment of foreign liabilities or the purchase of foreign assets, real credits also decline relative to base money. The figures are expressed as shares of GSP and are estimates, calculated from 9 In figure 4, credits and base money were divided by the December CPIs, based in December 1980, while the foreign liabilities were converted into German Marks (the dominant currency) at the cross-currency rates of December 1980 and multiplied by the Dinar/German Mark rate of December 1980. The real net worth was calculated as a residual. This procedure is consistent with equation (5), and allows one to track the evolution of real foreign liabilities and the real net worth net of the impact of the real devaluations of the Dinar. If the net foreign liabilities had been simply divided by the price leval, their increase in 1983 would have been more pronounced, and the decline in real net worth stronger.
10 For instance, in the case of selective credits the table show the changes in selective credits minus the interest revenues on these credits, c -rcca A similar procedure is applied in the case of the FX insurance scheme and the operations with the external sector. information on the stocks and interest rates. A detailed description of the methodology used is provided in Rocha (1989) . However, the volume of resources channelled to finance quasi-fiscal operations was also significant, especially in 1989, when it reached more than 4 percent of GSP.
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Although the above analysis shows that central bank deficits were an 11 These estimates are based on data on stocks and interest rates and are subject to some measurement errors. Thus, the objective of the exercise is to provide information on trends and orders of magnitude. Nevertheless, the findings are broadly in line with those provided by other authors (Bole and Gaspari 1990 and Mates 1991) , which also show the increasing burden of real interest payments in 1985-87, followed by a period where the decrease in net foreign liabilities dominated the process of money creation. important source of monetary expansion and inflation, it might also suggest that these deficits were only indirectly related to enterprise imbalances, and that the link between domestic imbalances and inflationary finance was limited to central bank operations. However, the whole volume of inflationary taxation was not limited to the collection of seignorage on base money.
Since commercial banks paid negative real interest rates on all deposits through most of the 1980s, the total volume was much larger than that collected from base money alone. This point must be stressed, since it brings to the fore the distributional aspect of inflation in Yugoslavia, particularly the distribution of real resources from holders of Dinar assets towards enterprises. Indeed, the subsidies on domestic credits helped enterprises bear the burden of the external transfer and kept a large number of loss making enterprises afloat during the 1980s. Furthermore, the dependency of these enterprises on subsidized financing has always been a serious obstacle to successful stabilization in Yugoslavia.
An accurate calculation of the total resource transfers would require detailed information on interest rates and the maturity breakdown of domestic deposits and credits. The absence of critical pieces of information precludes the conduct of such exercise. However, the potential size of seignorage collected by the consolidated financial system can be appreciated by comparing the relative magnitudes of gross seignorage on base money and MI in table 5.12 Dornbusch and Simonsen 1987; and Pazos 1978) . It is useful to review a basic version of the model in order to assess its relevance to Yugoslavia. To this end, assume that prices are determined by a mark-up over costs, including labor costs and the costs of intermediate inputs, as in equation (7):
Where P is the price level, W is the nominal wage, E is the nominal exchange rate, PM* is the foreign price of the imported intermediate input, aL and aM are the unit labor and intermediate goods requirements, respectively, and the subscript t is the time period. The mark-up is set equal to zero for simplicity. The real exchange rate is defined by:
Where e is the real exchange rate and P is the foreign currency price of the good competing with the country's exports in world markets. Substituting (8) into (7) and assuming that all international prices are equal to unity, a relationship between the real wage, w, and the real exchange rate is obtained: Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the real exchange rate and the real wage in Yugoslavia 13 . Note the two periods when there was a clear effort to maintain the real exchange rate at a targeted level: 1983 to mid-1986 and 1988 to mid-1989. In 1986-87 the real exchange rate target was partly abandoned and real wages were allowed to increase. The same happened in the 13 The real exchange rate was measured by a simple basket of two real, bilateral exchange rates (the Dinar/US$ and the Dinar/DM) with equal weights. The average real wage was measured by the average nominal personal income divided by the CPI. second half of 1989. However, also note that even in these periods the real wage was usually below the levels of the 1970s. 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1998 1999 1990 1991 Of course, one has to bear in mind that unit labor costs decreased much less than real wages. For one, the overall decline in labor productivity offset in part the fall in real wages. Also, the imposition of heavier payroll taxes and other enterprise taxes also tended to increase unit labor costs. In the enterprises where the problem of excess labor was more severe, unit labor costs incltding taxes actually increased. Nevertheless, the figure does reveal the effort to drive down real wages and enforce a real devaluation.
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The question is how the observed decrease in the real wage was obtained in Yugoslavia. The Pazos-Simonsen mechanism postulates that, under real wage rigidity, it takes an increase in inflation to engineer a decline in the real wage. To understand this mechanism, assume that the adjustment of nominal wages follows the rule Wt -cPt 1 1 , that is, a backward indexation formula. Clearly, the parameter C is the peak real wage, that is, the level of the real wage immediately after the adjustment, while the effective real wage is wt -Wt/Pt.
It is easy to note that the extent to which the effective real wage falls below the peak depends on the rate of inflation between t-l and t. The relationship between the real exchange rate and the rate of inflation, ITt, follows by a simple
The relevance of the Papoe-Simoneen mechanism for the Yugoslav case can be assessed by examining the rules governing the adjustment of nominal wages in the 1980s. The basic principle that was followed in Yugoslavia in the 1980s was the principle of relative performance. Any enterprise was allowed to pay higher than average wages if it could demonstrate that it had achieved a better than average performance. This principle was formulated as an attempt to avoid excessive wage payments and was made operational through a formula of "business performance" (Konovalov 1989; Saldanha 1989; and Vodopive,c 1989) . The implications of this principle for the short-run behavior of real wages are unclear, since there were no explicit rules for wage adjustments within the year.
In 1987, however, the government introduced an explicit formula for adjustments within the year. It divided total wage payments for each enterprise between two parts. The first part was considered as a basic labor cost, and subject to periodic adjustments within the year. The second part was determined by the relative performance of the enterprise, as discussed above. The first part was defined as 80 percent of enterprises' net operating income (revenues minus non-labor costs) in the previous year, adjusted for increases in the cost of living--a wage indexation rule.14 14 Bole and Gaspari (1990) also indicate that indexation became widespread after 1987.
The impact of the introduction of wage indexation in 1987 may be examined by inspecting the dynamic properties of the rate of inflation. Rewriting equation (7), (8) Therefore, under these conditions the inflation process is fully inertial.
Of course, this crude version of the model assumes implicitly the existence of monetary accommodation. Indeed, the specification of the aggregate demand and the central bank's reaction function indicate that full inertia only results if there is also full monetary accommodation by the central bank (Cardoso 1981 and 1983; Barbosa and McNellis 1989; and Barbosa and Vale 1989) .15
To examine whether the data supports the hypothesis of fully inertial inflation, the stochastic component of the inflationary process must still be specified. One possibility is simply to add a disturbance term to equation (14), thus modelling the rate of inflation as a random walk:
Where ut is a white noise stochastic process. A second possibility is to model the rate of inflation as a local-level model, i.e., a random welk plus noise model (Harvey 1989) . That assumes that inflation consists of an inertial 15 The model can also be extended in other directions, such as the nonsynchronization of wage adjustments across different classes of workers, end the declining periodicity of wage adjustments (Simonsen 1989) . component, as in equation (15), plus a random noise (Barbosa and Vale 1989) :
Where ff is the inertial component and et is a white noise stochastic process. The reduced form of the local-level model is an ARIMA (0,1,1) (Harvey 1989) , while the first model is an ARIMA (0,1,0). In either case we will be testing for the existence of unit roots in the inflation series. Table 6 reproduces the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test Fuller, 1979 and 1981; Dickey et al 1986; and Nelson and Plosser 1982) for the monthly rates of inflation (CPI) over successive sample periods, with the beginning of the sample fixed at January 1977. The recursive estimates of the lagged inflation coefficient are shown in figure 7 .
The results indicate that during 1988 the nature of the stochastic process generating the inflation series changed. Until 1988 the hypothesis of a unit root in the inflation series is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance.
At the same time, the trend coefficient is quite significant. Therefore, the inflation series seems to follow a trend-stationary (TS) process during this period, as opposed to a difference stationary (DS) process (Nelson and Plosser, 1982) 16. In sum, the stochastic nature of the inflation series during this period does not suggest the existence of inertia.
When the sample is extended beyond 1988, however, the hypothesis of a unit root and a DS cannot be rejected. Moreover, figure 7 indicates that the structural break started in June 1988, following the real devaluation of the previous month and the maintenance of the real exchange rate at the new target.
Note also that after the real devaluation of mid-1988, inflation rates stabilized on a higher plateau, while real wages fell initially (figure 8). Such behavior 16 The statistic associated with the lagged rate of inflation is compared against the Dickey-Fuller tables for the r distribution (where the estimation includes the constant and the trend variable). The significance of the term in lagged differences is tested against a standard t-distribution. See also Harvey (1990) ., Two conclusions may be drawn from the analysis above. First, the second experiment with real exchange rate targets had a much stronger impact on inflation than the first, despite the smaller real devaluation. That reflects the relatively low downward resistance of real wages in the early 1980s, and the increased real wage rigie ty at the end of the decade. Second, the lagged 17 The "blip" in the coefficient in late 1987 reflects the real devaluation of that same period. Since that devaluation was not sustained (figure 6), the coefficient declined during the first semester of 198C. inflation coefficient kept increasing in 1989, despite the fact that wage formation shifted partly from backward to forward looking. Thus, although the test is capturing the increased importance of these non-fiscal factors at the end of the decade, the results also lend support to the observation made by other authors, namely, that such univariate tests are not sufficiently strong to differentiate backward-looking inertia from a forward-looking wage mechanism Leiderman 1988 and The inconsistencies of the mid-1988 program were aggravated by a real devaluation (figure 6) whose rationale was unclear, since the country was already running a large current account surplus and was also engaged in debt rescheduling negotiations with private foreign banks. As it happened, the real devaluation defeated one of the main purposes of the external debt rescheduling, which was to relieve the pressure of external debt payments on the domestic economy.
The attempt to maintain the real exchange rate undervalued in the context of formal wage indexation resulted in a strong acceleration of wages and prices, as shown above. The real devaluation also increased the burden of foreign interest payments, thus offsetting in part the benefits of the rescheduling of commercial debt. The pressure to finance hidden losses, particularly the central 18 However, Petrovic (1990) formulates and explicit model and concludes for the existence of inertia in the Yugoslav inflation.
bank'o own deficit, led policy-makers to abandon the monetary targets soon after their implementation. Faced with higher real interest rates on bank credits several enterprises simply stopped paying, aggravating considerably the already severe problem of non-perfcsming loans in the commercial banks.
The failure of the 1988 stabilization program showed the futility of implementing another program without addressing the fundamental domestic imbalances. Thus, during 1989, consensus was reached about the need to generate a surplus in the non-financial public sector in order to cover losses elsewhere in the economy, even though there was less certainty about the required magnitude of the fiscal adjustment, or the best strategy to deal with the loss-makers.
In the case of the central bank's own deficit, the solution was clear, and consisted basically in transferring the servicing of its foreign exchange liabilities, and its credit subsidies to favored sectors to the federal budget.
In the case of enterprises and commercial banks, the situation was less clear.
Although enterprise losses where regularly calculated, the magnitude of accounting problems decreased the reliance on the available figures. The situation of commercial banks was not fully transparent either. The share of non performing loans was known to be large, but the estimates were still tentative. In addition, the government had not completed the design of a welldefined strategy to deal with the loss-makers. For instance, there were still doubts of whether to provide a fiscal subsidy to lose-makers, while submitting them to restructuring programs (involving lay-offs, debt write-offs, selective improving investments, changes in management, and so on), or whether to let the Darwinian-Schumpeterian law of natural selection operate freely. In this case, the number of bankruptcies was expected to increase much more rapidly, and the fiscal resources would be directed towards social programs, as opposed to loss Incomes policy comprised a 6-month freeze in the exchange rate, nominal wages, and a set of public sector prices accounting to 20 percent of the CPI.
The exchange rate freeze was later extended to 1 year. The exchange rate and public sector prices were frozen after a series of adjustments in late 1989.
However, the devaluations that preceded the freeze were rapidly eroded by the increase in prices that followed the implementation of the program, as shown in The recognition that the exchange rate had become severely appreciated led to a corrective 30 percent devaluation on January 1, 1991, as well as a the suspension of convertibility. These measures were unavoidable, given the large loss of reserves at the end oE 1990. However, they also led to an increase in inflation in early 199L (5 and 10 percent in January and February, respectively), despite the reimposition of wage controls and efforts to reassert control over monetary policy. Moreover, the erosion of the first devaluation led to a second corrective devaluation of 45 percent in April 1991. Therefore, the challenge faced by policy-makers in 1991 is to obtain the countrywide consensus that will allow the continuous enforcement of wage, monetary and fiscal policies which is required to prevent the reemergence of an exchange rate-wages-prices spiral. 
